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Clodomiro José Bannwart Junior and Carlos Frederico Oléa, Londrina / Brazil
 
 
Litigation and new technologies in Post-Conventional Societies 
 
Abstract: The increase in the volume of litigation verified since the 1990’s, having the Brazilian society as 
context, made the judiciary open itself to new technologies which facilitate the access to justice, as well as 
to a faster resolution of the demands. However, the intense insertion of technical rationalization in the 
process and decision operations by the judiciary, during the last years, led to a legalization supported by 
presuppositions of technical-instrumental regulation. According to the goal policy established by the CNJ, 
the annoyance of the instrumental rationality is present “with respect to purposes”, which demands, more 
and more, a mere fulfillment of previously instituted goals from the law operators. The matter is to know if 
the implementation of new technologies to solve the growing litigation coming from the complexity of 
societies is enough to adjust the Law to a post-conventional platform.  If the social complexity implies 
resources  coming  from  new  technologies,  it’s  not  certain  that  such  technologies,  on  their  own, 
satisfactorily answer a judicial model which, seen under the eyes of the post- conventional legitimacy and 
regulation, is adequate to complex societies. This illustrates that a judicial model, able to deal with the 
social  plurality,  must  take  into  account  not  only  the  rules  of  instrumental  rationality,  but  also  the 
fundamental issues of communicative rationality. This current work intends to evaluate if the applicability 
of the instrumental rationality in the judiciary equally allows the law to extent the useful conditions of the 
communicative rationality to the consensual formation of will and opinion in the Democratic State of Law. 
Keywords: 25th IVR; Brazilian Judiciary, Law; Ethical; Moral; Habermas; Democratic State of Law  
 
Introduction 
There is no denying that Law and the whole judicial apparatus structure occupy important role in 
society  as  an  inherent  part  of  the  State  provision  that  allows  promotion  of  jurisdictional 
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attendance  and  consensual  solution  to  conflicts.  For  this  reason,  the  judiciary  cannot  stand 
disconnected from theoretical assumptions focused on the social practice. 
In Brazil, especially from the 60’s on, the country was plunged for 20 years under the aegis 
of a military regime, a totalitarian structure that excised any possibility of democratic exercise. 
From the theoretical point of view, during that period, extending from the 60’s  to the 80’s, a 
considerable number of social scientists and philosophers in the country began to start readings 
from the Marxist perspective in order to understand Brazilian reality and in that sense, the Law 
was then seen as secondary, if not irrelevant, to the very basis of reflection of reality in the 
country.
1 
With the process of democratization of the Brazilian State in the 1980s and the direct 
offshoot of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1988, there was a clear perception from  the 
theoreticians of Human Sciences that the absence of Law in the explanation of the Brazilian 
reality should no longer be maintained.  To Nobre “a partir da d￩cada de 90, cientistas sociais, 
filósofos e historiadores passam a se interessar de uma maneira acentuada pelo Direito” (Nobre, 
2005, p. 27).
 2 
3 
It is understood that in the 1990s, in Brazil, the reactivation of a kind of consortium of 
humanities, placed Law in the center of discussions for the purpose of self -understanding of the 
new structured format of the Brazilian reality of the democratic state of law. 
The State of law, therefore, assumes the role of ensuring access to justice, giving rise to 
increased volume of litigation upheld by the judiciary. A significant growth in demand for 
solutions  of disputes in the courtrooms began   to excessively inflate the number of actions 
approved upon by the judiciary. The ratio between the number of actions received by the 
judiciary and the number of sentences handed down has ceased to close. Along with that , the 
judiciary, in the late 1980s, attended only 33% of the demand of those conflicts of people, and 
failed, along the 1990’s, to satisfactorily respond to the volume of litigation that was increasing 
considerably. The lack of technical infrastructure and magistrates opened a catastrophic scenario 
of collapse of the judiciary. The data show that the 1990s were marked, on the one hand, by 
inflating of litigiousness and, on the other, by a deficit in the presented conflicts' resolution. 
The question, however, which this article intends to discuss, lies in the attempt to show that 
the Brazilian government and especially the judiciary, when seeking mechanisms to prevent the 
                                                           
1 Oscar Vilhena Vieira, Direito e Ciências Humanas, in: O que é pesquisa em Direito? ed. Marcos Nobre, 2005, 121. 
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3 Marcos Nobre. O que é pesquisa em Direito? 2005, 27.  
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collapse  of  its  functional  structure  through  a  technical-instrumental  apparatus,  acts  as  if  this 
functionalist dimension - both strategic and pragmatic - was sufficient to meet the challenges 
posed by the State of law. 
Disregarding the importance and relevance of the pragmatic dimension that the judiciary 
must have in order to ensure access to justice and also the efficient resolution of conflicts, the 
validity claims of achievement of the assumptions of justice is not intended. However, a judiciary 
limited  to  the  mere  functionalist  structure,  ruled  by  new  technologies,  is  unable  by  itself  to 
achieve the underlying assumptions inherent to the Democratic State of Law.  
In short, the Brazilian judiciary does not respond to the challenges of contemporary times 
and to the increasing volume of litigation only with mechanisms of an instrumental rationality 
structure, by the efficiency measured mathematically, but above all with the tools of the State of 
law.  
Moreover,  as  demonstrated  in  the  Habermas'  theory  of  communicative  action,  the 
understanding of contemporary social theory repositions two action models that, consequently, 
unfold in two models of rationality. On one side, the technical-scientific action (instrumental 
rationality) which entails the maintenance and preservation of material reproduction of society 
from  the  perspective  of  functionalism,  and  the  other,  the  action  language  (communicative 
rationality)  that  provides  the  conditions  for  the  symbolic  reproduction  of  society,  under  the 
perspective of social interaction. As it is known, Habermas aims at demonstrating, in spite of 
Marxism, the communicative dimension that precedes the instrumental dimension, making one 
see  that  the  basis  of  social  interaction  (communicative  rationality)  is  what  maintains  and 
stabilizes the development of the technical and instrumental dimension. 
This parallel with Habermas is what this article intends to show. That is, the Law cannot be 
seen and/or analyzed in a unilateral way, but always in its complex structure, since it conforms to 
a  functionalist  dimension  (instrumental)  and,  also,  to  a  normative  dimension 
(communicative).When analyzed in this expanded perspective, Law - as part of the very practical 
reason - is still possible to be considered in function of pragmatics, ethics and moral. 
As soon as the judicial structure gives an account of the disputes through the exclusive 
pragmatic structure - taking a functionalist approach measured by the effectiveness of the results 
- it does not mean that giving an end to a greater volume of litigation is, in fact, contributing to 
the achievement of justice according to the ethical (values) and moral (principles) aspects.   
4 
The  democratic  state  of  law,  as  it  assimilates,  in  essence,  the  exercise  of  interaction, 
regulatory and communicative of the public sphere, will certainly demand a legal model that 
equally  contemplates,  in  its  structure,  the  conditions  to  enforce  the  assumptions  of 
communicative rationality, and not just the instrumental rationality. 
 
I. Reactions to the crisis announced in the Brazilian Judiciary  
Prognostics like that of SADEK and ARANTES
4 that the annual increase of residual cases  or 
recently termed as "jamming rate" would tend to accumulate, seems to remain confirmed. The so-
called crisis of the judiciary  that the national literature refers to
5, which is not limited to the 
structural issue, also involves institutional issues and procedural related ones. 
SADEK studies
6, ten years later, signaled that “todos os dados relativos à movimentação do 
Poder  Judiciário  mostraram  um  traço  comum:  a  defasagem  entre  o  número  de  processos 
entrados  e  julgados”
7and  that  “normalmente,  aponta-se  o  pequeno  número  de  juízes  como 
responsável por esta situação".
8 According to "Justice in Numbers ", 2nd edition, year 2004 there 
were 7.45 judges per 100,000 inhabitants (in the three spheres of justice). 
The collapse was lurking in, and besides the structural problem, the generalized discredit 
indicated “um problema na media￧ão dos conflitos sociais por parte do direito que, desse modo, 
tem  comprometida  a  plena  realização  de  sua  função  de  estabilização  das  expectativas 
normativas”.
9 
10 
Different proposals have emerged to improve the functioning of justice
11, among which 
computerization  of  judicial  services  and  the reduction  of  procedural  steps,  which  received 
substantial membership of judges asked (93.2% and  90.2%) in importance, according to a study 
                                                           
4 Maria Teresa Sadek e Rogério Bastos Arantes, A Crise do Judiciário e a visão dos Juízes, Revista da USP (1994), 
39. 
5 See on this subject among others FARIA (1988 e 1996), Ordem legal x mudança social: a crise do judiciário e a 
formação do magistrado e A crise do Poder Judiciário no Brasil; GRINOVER (1990) A crise do poder judiciário; 
FAGUNDES (1991) A crise do Poder Judiciário; MARTINS (1999), A crise do Poder Judiciário, causas e soluções; 
CORREA (2000), Breves ponderações sobre a crise do Poder Judiciário; PASSOS (2002), A crise do Poder 
Judiciário e as reformas instrumentais: avanços e retrocessos. 
6 Maria Teresa Sadek, Poder Judiciário: Perspectivas de Reforma, Opinião Pública, Vol. X, nº 1, Maio (2004), 18. 
7 All data concerning the movement of the judiciary have shown a common trait: the gap between the number of 
cases brought and prosecuted. 
8 Normally it indicates the small number of judges as responsible for this situation. 
9 A problem in the mediation of social conflicts by the law which has compromised the completion of its function 
while stabilizing normative expectations. 
10 Orlando Villas Bôas Filho, Teoria dos sistemas e o direito brasileiro, 2009, 388.  
11 See Sadek and Arantes (note 4), 43.  
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program developed in 1993 about the Judiciary by IDESP - Institute for Economic, Social and 
Political Studies of São Paulo.  
Changes occurred between 1990 and 2010 - accompanied by advances in computing and 
information - and perhaps they explain, in part, the statistical changes. The most striking may be 
those that composed the so-called Judicial Reform, introduced by Constitutional Amendment No. 
45/2004, vs., creation of the agency of external control of the judiciary (CNJ), the institution of 
binding abridgement in the Supreme Federal Court (STF) and the general effect and prediction of 
the essential warranty that everyone in the judicial and administrative, are assured a reasonable 
duration of the process and means ensuring the speed of its progress.  
However,  before  (2004),  laws  had  been  adopted  which,  to  some  extent,  may  have 
contributed, such as
12  the Special Civil and Crimin al Courts (1995), the urgency protections 
provided by amendment of the CPC (1994), creation of action monitoring/Law No. 9.079 (1995), 
Arbitration Law (1996), and various other changes in the Civil Procedure Code, which set up 
mechanisms to curb abuse in disputes, among which the judge’s possibility of the sentencing the 
litigant party disputing in bad-faith to indemnify the other party/Law No. 8.952/94, penalty for 
appeals with a procrastinating aim/Law No. 9.668/98, stipulation of the parties' duties and those 
who participate in the process, in compliance with the accuracy of coordinator provisions and not 
impede  the  effectiveness  of  judicial  provisions/Law  No.  10.358/01.It  is  also  noteworthy  a 
forecast made so that the judge could try, at any time, to reconcile the parties/Law No. 8952 
(1994). 
After the Constitutional Amendment No. 45/2004 other laws can also be remarked, which 
somehow have a scope to reduce litigation and to seek judicial economy, for example, the law 
authorizing the judge of first instance not to receive an appeal when the sentence is in accordance 
with a binding abridgement of the Superior Justice Court or the Supreme Federal Court/Law No. 
11.276  (2006)  and  establishing  procedures  for  the  prosecution  of  repetitive  resources  in  the 
Superior Justice Court (admission of resource representative of the controversy and suspension of 
the remainders until a definitive statement)/Law No. 11.672 (2008).  
In relation to changes that are objectively inserted in the judicial system, technologies may 
be  referred  to  the  provisions  allowing  the  parties  the  use  of  data  system  for  the  practice  of 
procedural  acts  (Law  No.  9.800/99),  which  made  the  Courts  to  discipline  official 
communications practices of procedural acts by electronic means (Law No. 11.280/06), which 
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provided information about the lawsuit, the electronic communication of process acts and the 
electronic process (Law No. 11.419/06), which contribute to prosecution speed.   
Regarding the number of judges, at least between 2004 and 2010, according to "Justice in 
Numbers ", the change was of 7.45 judges per 100,000 inhabitants (three spheres of justice) to 8.4 
judges,  which  still  proves  below  expected  when  compared  to  the  global  average,  to  see  the 
number of Judges in Portugal, 18 per 100,000 inhabitants (where the overall average was 20.6 per 
100,000) according to data from the 2008 Assessment Report of the European Judicial Systems 
(CEPEJ - 2010).The number of assistants in the Federal, Labor and State Courts, in 2004, of 
approximately 136 per 100,000 inhabitants arrived in 2009 to 163 per 100,000.Such work force 
compared with Portugal, is far higher, where it presented in 2008, an average of 63.9 per 100,000 
population (where the overall average was 67.5 per 100,000 inhabitants), which suggests that, 
compared to other countries Brazil has proportionally fewer judges and many servers, for a load 
of demands. 
The structural collapse which lurked was avoided and, indeed, it has been avoided although 
the “problemas são muitos, graves e longevos. No entanto, pode-se sustentar que foi rompida a 
in￩rcia e enfrentados tabus”.
13 
14 And the new technologies, which promised to contribute to 
greater efficiency and speed, would be contributing in some measure.  
Report from a member of the Superior Court, who entered the judiciary as a judge 35 years 
ago, like that of the current Minister President of the STJ (biennium 2010-2012) reveals both the 
technological advances, such as the route of litigation, and the effect on adjudication when 
commenting in an interview
15 that in the recent past, in Brazil: 
“ [...] O juiz tinha que ter a sua máquina de escrever pessoal. Lembro-me de um colega que 
comprou uma daquelas máquinas IBM com tecla corretiva [...] Quando sobreveio a Constituição 
de  1988,  houve  uma  mudança  substancial.  Eu  fui  para  o  Tribunal  Regional  Federal  da  4ª 
Região, que foi criado junto com os outros quatro que existem hoje.  [...] Os juízes também 
passaram a ganhar muito bem. Éramos cinco juízes federais para todo o estado do Rio Grande 
do Sul. A tecnologia e os novos recursos materiais facilitaram muito o trabalho. Para fazer 
pesquisa,  usávamos  fichários.  Um  colega  que  era  juiz  em  Santa  Catarina  foi  apelidado  de 
                                                           
13 Problems are many and serious and long-living. However, it can be argued that the inertia was broken and the 
taboos faced. 
14 Maria Teresa Sadek, Poder Judiciário: uma nova instituição, Cadernos Adenauer, XI (2010), 17. 
15 Conjure, 29/08/2010. Interview of the Minister ARI PARGLENDER to RODRIGO HAIDAR , article entitled, 
“Juiz não pode ser avaliado por estatísticas” (A judge cannot be measured by statistics). Available at 
http://www.conjur.com.br/2010-ago-29/entrevista-ministro-ari-pargendler-presidente-eleito-stj.   
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sapateiro porque tinha no gabinete caixas e mais caixas de sapato cheia de fichas com anotações 
e recortes de Diário Oficial. Todos usávamos isso. [...] Quando entrei, quem sentenciava um 
processo por dia era considerado um juiz cumpridor. Nem todos conseguiam dar uma sentença 
por dia porque não é fácil dar uma sentença. As pessoas pensam que o juiz dá um espirro e a 
sentença sai. Não é assim. Há casos difíceis. A decisão do juiz tem que ser motivada. A sentença 
só é legitima quando a motivação é racional. E o juiz tem que analisar uma série de argumentos, 
mesmo os mais impertinentes, sob pena de a parte dizer que ele não respondeu. Esse trabalho 
não combina com a epidemia de ações. E o que isso provocou? O grande número de processos 
homogeneizou os juízes.. [...] Hoje eu não posso dizer se um juiz trabalha ou não trabalha 
porque tudo é medido por números. E os números podem ser decompostos assim: o juiz dá uma 
sentença, os assessores adaptam para outros 100 mil casos e ele aparece na imprensa como um 
grande trabalhador. Mas dentro da comunidade dos juízes se sabe que aquele não é um trabalho 
dele. Muitas vezes, o grande juiz é o que julga menos do que os outros. O juiz se tornou uma 
unidade de produção. Mas onde está a qualidade? A Justiça é um valor que não se mede com 
n￺meros.”
16  
 
II. Of litigation in Brazil  
According to official indicators of the Brazilian Judiciary
17 , only in 2009, an inflow of 25.5 
million cases was observed, considering the three spheres of Justice (Federal, State and Labor 
Justices) in the 1st and 2nd instances (Courts and Judges), projecting 11,865 new cases per group 
                                                           
16 [...]The judge had to have his personal typewriter. I remember a colleague who bought one of those IBM machines 
with a corrective key [...] When the 1988 Constitution came there was a substantial change. I went to the Federal 
Regional Court at the 4th Region, which was created along with the other four that exist up to day. [...] The judges 
also began earning quite well. We were a group of five federal judges throughout the state of Rio Grande do Sulk. 
Technology and new material resources greatly facilitated the work. To do research, we used binders. A colleague 
who was a judge in Santa Catharina was nicknamed "shoemaker" because he had so many shoe boxes in the cabinet, 
all of them full of cards with notes and clippings from the Daily Journal. All of us used them. [...] When I entered, 
who sentenced a process per day was considered a compliant judge. Not everyone could give a sentence a day 
because it is not easy to sentence. People think that the judge sneezes and sentence comes out. It is not so. There are 
difficult cases. The judge's decision must be motivated. The sentence is only legitimate when the motivation is 
rational. And the judge has to examine a range of arguments, even the most irrelevant ones, under the chance of one 
party say that he did not answer. This work does not match the epidemic actions. And what has caused this? The 
large number of processes has homogenized the judges. [...] Today I cannot tell if a judge is working or not working 
because everything is measured by numbers. And the numbers can be decomposed as follows: the judge makes a 
sentence, assistants fit it to another 100 thousand cases and it appears in the press as a great worker. But within the 
community of judges it is known that that is not a job of his. Often, the great judge is the one who judges less than 
the others. The judge has become a production unit. But where is the quality? Justice is a value that is not measured 
with numbers.  
17 Conselho Nacional de Justiça - CNJ (National Council of Justice). Justiça em números 2009: Indicadores do Poder 
Judiciário, Brasília, 2010 (Justice in Numbers 2009: Indicators of the Judiciary, Brasília, 2010). Executive Summary. 
Available at http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/programas/justicaemnumeros.   
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of one hundred thousand inhabitants, while by the end of 2009, there were 61.1 million cases 
pending, therefore, about 86.6 million of cases ongoing in 2009.The “Justi￧a brasileira na 1ª 
instância,  em  suas  três  esferas,  recebeu,  em  média,  para  cada  magistrado  atuante, 
aproximadamente 1.399 casos novos” (CNJ, 2009, p.8).
18 
19 
Considering only the cases that entered the 1st instance justice court, in 2009 they summed 
up to 12,577,193, 948,901 and 2,880,565 in State, Federal and Labor courts, respectively, while 
44,741,063, 4,133,084 and 3,010,351 cases were pending in those three spheres. Excluded from  
these latest figures, therefore, were the entering new cases in the Courts and Special Courts. 
The study "Justice in Numbers" of CNJ, also focuses in addition to admission of cases, on 
the one hand, an indicator called the jamming rate "to measure in a given year, the percentage of 
ongoing  lawsuits  that  have  not  yet  been  definitely  downloaded"
20  and  on  the  other  hand  
“indicator-making process termination by a magistrate in the 1st degree "
21 which according to 
the criteria, would appoint  “judges' productivity, ie, how many sentences were handed down at 
any given time".
22 
According to these criteria in "2009, the rate of overall congestion of the Brazilian Justice 
was 71%"
23 and thus, the data reveal that "in all branches of Justice, the main bottleneck is the 
total of processes that are not finalized in the 1st instance. Of every 100 lawsuits ongoing, only 
24 were completed by the end of the year"
24, however, "the 2009 data showed that the Brazilian 
justice system is closer to achieve the goal of reducing more cases regarding those which enter 
the judiciary - this figure reached 99% by 2009".
25 
Studies of the 1990s showed that   “para  o  País  como  um  todo,  entraram  na  primeira 
instância da justiça comum, 4.209.623 processos em 1990 e foram resolvidos, no mesmo período, 
apenas  2.434.842”
26 
27, which has already signaled that   “se  pensarmos  que  o  número  de 
processos entrados tende a aumentar anualmente e que o resíduo de um ano para outro tende a se 
                                                           
18 Brazilian Justice in a 1st instance court, in its three spheres, received, on average, per every active judge, about 
1,399 new cases. 
19 See CNJ (note 17), 8.  
20 See CNJ (note 17), 8. 
21 See CNJ (note 17), 9. 
22 See CNJ (note 17), 9. 
23 See CNJ (note 17), 15. 
24 See CNJ (note 17), 16. 
25 See CNJ (note 17), 16. 
26 For the country as a whole, 4,209,623 cases in 1990 entered the first instance of common justice and in the same 
period only 2,434,842 were judged. 
27 See Sadek e Arantes (note 4).  
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acumular, a precariedade da situação pode bem ser explicada pela imagem de uma bola de neve 
que vem crescendo em ritmo assustador”.
28 
29 
Other comparative data, referring to the Superior Courts, among them the Superior Labor 
Court, Superior Court and the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Federal Court, show that in the 
first two (TST and STJ), respectively, 14,087 and 20,276 cases were assigned in 1990, while in 
2010, 204,182 and 228,981 cases were assigned. In the Constitutional Court, in 1990, 18 ,564 
cases were filled with 16,449 trials, while in 2010, 71,670 cases were perpetrated with 103,869 
trials, which designs in 2010, considering 11 members of the Court, a charge of 6.5 thousand new 
cases and 9,4 thousand judged for each Court Minister. 
However, at least in these three High Courts, STF, STJ and TST ( Supreme Federal Court, 
Superior Court of Justice and Superior Labor Court) with statistical records from 1990 to 2010, it 
is observed, since 2008, on the one hand, a stabilization or even an appa rent decrease of cases 
coming into, and on the other hand, a rise in lawsuits that are judged. The table below gives this 
reading: 
 
   1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000 
Courts:  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged 
STF  18,5  16.4  27.4  18.2  24,3  28,2  28.1  30,8  52.6  51,3  105,3  86,1 
STJ  14.1  11,7  33,9  31,4  38.7  43,0  77,0  77,6  92,1  101,5  150,7  154,2 
TST  20.3  20,5  24,8  28,4  65,8  44,7  106,7  57,9  131,4  111,8  125,5  98.8 
   2002  2004  2006  2008  2010    
Courts:  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged  Ent.  Judged       
STF  160,5  83.1  83,7  101,7  127,5  110,3  100,8  130,7  71,7  103,9       
STJ  156,0  172,0  215,4  241,3  251,0  262,3  271,5  354,0  229,0  330,3       
TST  115,7  87,6  133,1  116,7  145,1  135,7  183,2  223,4  204,2  212,0       
Source: Prepared according to statistical data available on the websites of the STF (Supreme 
Federal  Court)
30, STJ (Superior Court  of  Justice)
31  and TST (Superior Labor  Court)
32 
(Figures in thousands). 
                                                           
28 If we think that the number of new cases entered tends to increase annually and that the residue from one year to 
another tends to accumulate, the precariousness of the situation may be explained by the image of a snowball which 
has been growing at a frightening rate. 
29 See Sadek e Arantes (note 4). 
30 See http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=estatistica&pagina=movimentoProcessual.  
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The statistical data released by the STF for the year 2011, until April 30 of 20,472 litigated 
and 28,876 cases judged, project at this pace until the end of 2011, approximately 61,000 case 
proceedings to about 80,000 trials, which seems to confirm the trend.  
However, we must not ignore the warning of Orlando Villas Bôas Filho
33 that the “grau de 
recorrência aos tribunais não deve ser tomado como um dado absoluto”
34, and also that, besides 
the  “deficiência  estrutural  na  capacidade  de  resposta  dos  tribunais  torna-se  ainda  mais 
significativa se se considera o baixo grau de acesso da popula￧ão”
35 
36 , which is confirmed in 
the work of SADEK and ARANTES
37, supported by IBGE data for 1988, in the sense that 
“apenas 33% das pessoas envolvidas em algum tipo de conflito dirigem-se para o Judiciário em 
busca de uma solução para seus problemas. A maior parte dos litígios sequer chega a uma corte 
de justi￧a”.
38 
Although IBGE 2009 related numbers, restricted to period of 5 years and related to 18 -or-
more-year-old people who may have been involved in a more serious conflict situation, project 
the seeking for Justice and Special Judging solution, in an expressive amount of 57,8% and 
12,4% of the cases respectively, 54,4% of those who went for justice haven’t gotten a solution 
yet. 
 
III. Technical-pragmatic dimension 
Technological advances follow society and the Judiciary, contributing, on one hand, to greater 
access by people, and on the other, by providing technical tools that bring speed and completion 
to litigation endings. The structure created around the magistrate, the legal tools and targets on 
trials, contribute to the pacification of disputes, in an instrumental way and, to some extent, 
instrumental rationality suggests serving to the purpose of relieving its structural crisis, without 
necessarily  corresponding  to  entirely  withdraw  it  from  the  framework  of  disbelief  in  the 
effectiveness of dispute resolution or of law provision, its basic stabilizing function. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
31 See http://www.stj.jus.br/webstj/Processo/Boletim/?vPortalAreaPai=183&vPortalArea=584. 
32 See http://www.tst.gov.br/web/guest/estatistica.  
33 See Villas Bôas Filho (note 10), 390.   
34 Degree of recurrence to courts should not be taken as an absolute. 
35 Structural deficiency in responsiveness of the courts becomes even more significant if one considers the low 
degree of access of the population. 
36 See Villas Bôas Filho (note 10), 387.   
37 See Sadek and Arantes (note 4). 
38 Only 33% of the people involved in some kind of conflict are addressed to the Judiciary in search of a solution to 
their problems. Most disputes rarely reach a court of justice.  
11 
The state of things seems to move and serve the purpose of teleological rationality, driven by 
technical  rules,  whose  rational  choice  is  guided  by  strategies  which  involve  evaluative 
deductions.  According  to  Habermas  "a  ação  racional  teleológica  realiza  fins  definidos  sob 
condições  dadas;  a  ação  instrumental  organiza  meios  que  são  adequados  ou  inadequados 
segundo critério de um controle eficiente de realidade; e a ação estratégica depende apenas de 
uma valoração correta de possíveis alternativas”.
39 
40 
Respect the "ends" referred hereby or "telos" is supposed to be the  very pacification of 
litigation. Thus, it was already defined  before the actual opening of the judicial litigation.  The 
conflict comes in the Judiciary with a "telos"  which is self-extinguishing, where the direction 
points to adjudicate more entering processes and that, in a sense, demonstrates that the judiciary 
moves on a teleological platform. The question to be answered is: are   justice, accuracy of 
decisions and substantial right fully complied with on a  platform instructed by an instrumental 
rationality? 
Instrumental rationality is performed via judicial process and the value, that informs the 
action, refers to the functional efficiency in peacemaking. The mediation of conflicts from the 
center of the legal subsystem, the judiciary, within this context,  seems to lose the neutrality 
expected. Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Jr. by pointing repercussions of impact caused by the de -
neutralization of the Judiciary, states that: 
“[...] com a politiza￧ão da Justi￧a tudo passa a ser regido por rela￧￵es de meio e fim. O 
direito não perde sua condição de bem público, mas perde seu sentido de prudência, pois sua 
legitimidade deixa de repousar na concordância potencial dos homens, para fundar-se numa 
espécie  de  coerção:  a  coerção  da  eficácia  funcional.  Ou  seja,  politizada,  a  experiência 
jurisdicional torna-se presa de um jogo de estímulos e respostas que exige mais cálculo do que 
sabedoria. Segue-se daí uma rela￧ão tornada meramente pragm￡tica do juiz com o mundo”.
41 
42 
                                                           
39 Rational teleological action performs purposes defined under the given conditions; instrumental action organizes 
means that are appropriate or inappropriate at the discretion of an efficient control of reality; and strategic action 
depends only on a correct evaluation of possible alternatives. 
40 Jürgen Habermas, Técnica e ciência como ideologia, Os Pensadores, vol. XLVIII, 1975, 57. 
41 By the politicization of the Justice, everything shall be governed by relations of means and end. The law does not 
lose its status as a public good, but it loses its sense of caution, because its legitimacy ceases to stand on potential 
agreement of men, to be founded on a kind of coercion: coercion of functional effectiveness. That is, politicized, the 
judicial experience becomes prey to a set of stimuli and responses that require more calculation than wisdom. It 
follows a relationship, made purely pragmatic, by the judge with the world. 
42 Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Júnior, O Judiciário frente à divisão dos poderes: um princípio em decadência?  Revista da 
USP, n. 21 (1994), 21.  
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The operative action and pacification of disputes, from the perspective of a greater number 
of cases heard and closed, moves the qualitative discussion technical one, and the measurability 
tool for efficiency and success is now being restricted to the degree of access to the Judiciary and 
the quantitative answers that are given in shorter time. 
 
IV. On the Ethical (values) and Moral (justice) dimension 
A new profile of the judiciary, a more efficient one that tries to eliminate the bottleneck for 
decades, using new technological tools seeking faster resolution of works, highlights a one-sided 
look  at  the  very  law,  once  it  concentrates  on  its  conditions  of  possibility  of  technical  and 
operational instruments.  
Law, in Western literature, was influenced by a Roman tradition that is largely occupied 
with  its  systematization,  but  still  without  disregarding  the  Greek  tradition  that,  through 
philosophy, put  questions  on the legitimacy basis played by legal  norms  (nomos).Thus, it is 
unthinkable to  disregard the legal  reflection of  the larger sphere of practical  reason,  area of 
specific reflection of the philosophy that stands for analysis and reflection of rational human 
action, be it by the pragmatic, ethical or moral point of view of their own dimensions which form 
the constellations of the action of individual (moral and ethical), social (political) and normative 
(legal) point of view. 
It is, then, observed that law, when viewed in its normative dimension, should look onwards 
to the fact that it falls within the pragmatic (instrumental conditions of operation of its technical 
availability), ethical (inserted in the society’s own values and, thus, disposing many of these 
values as an approval positivised under its own legal order); and moral (search for performing the 
validity claims of justice). 
Therefore, the discussion that permeates the use of technological resources as to promote 
speed  and,  at  the  same  time,  access  to  justice  is  limited  greatly  only  by  one  aspect  of  the 
judiciary: the pragmatic dimension which, in turn, reveals itself on a model of action limited by 
the technical instrumentality. 
As mentioned above, the problem that pervades the Brazilian judiciary is not just a structural 
issue, but it involves other components of institutional and procedural character which, in large 
measure,  provokes  the  social  values  (ethical  dimension)  without  effectively  serving  the 
stabilization of behavior expectations (morals).  
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Here are two examples of this. The first refers to a survey conducted in 2009 by the Law 
School of Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), with the aim of measuring the Trust in Justice 
Index  (ICJBrasil).The  research  found  out  that  70%  of  Brazilians  doubt  the  honesty  and 
impartiality of the judiciary. These numbers tend to increase when analyzed by region, reaching, 
for example, 79% in the Northeast.  Also in this study, other items were evaluated. Regarding the 
capacity  of  conflict  resolution,  the  national  average  of  60.6%  of  respondents  said  that  the 
judiciary is not competent or has little power to resolve conflicts. The degree of satisfaction with 
the judiciary, considering participation of people who were in any ongoing judicial proceeding, 
30.2% said they were dissatisfied and 38.8% were little satisfied. Another point highlighted was 
the slowness of the judiciary, with 93.4% of respondents confirming that the judiciary is too 
slow. Access to justice in the issue, 59% responded that access to the judiciary, when it exists, is 
difficult to be reached.
 43  
The data show that in addition to structural problems (pragmatic), the Brazilian judiciary 
also lacks credibility in the society. The high figure of 70% of the national average of people who 
are distrustful of 'honesty and impartiality' of the judiciary, demonstrates an appallingly serious 
series of ethical implications in the relationship between the judiciary and society. The figures 
socially perceived as element of interaction and social integration are revealed scarce, in the 
perception of the citizen, in one of the major institutions of Brazilian Administration. 
The  second  example,  quite  recently  remarked  in  the  national  media  was  the  prison 
determined  by  the  STF  of  the  journalist  Antonio  Pimenta  Neves,  defendant  who  confessed 
murdering his girlfriend, the journalist Sandra Gomide, on August 20, 2001.He was only arrested 
nearly eleven years after the crime occurred. The defendant himself said when arrested: “Eu 
preferia ter começado a cumprir a pena logo após o julgamento. Assim já teria voltado a ser um 
homem normal, que vai ao restaurante ou ￠ padaria”.
44 
45 
The case took over the news and somehow forced  the STF president to publicly express a 
little rehearsed answer about the slowness of the judiciary.  The minister Cesar Peluso, the STF 
president, commented: "Todos os ministros foram textuais, atribuindo essa demora ao excesso de 
recursos (24 recursos no total). A defesa utilizou de todos os recursos disponíveis e impediram o 
                                                           
43 Folha de Londrina (Brazilian newspaper), 02/05/2010, 7. 
44 I would prefer to have begun serving the sentence immediately after the trial. So I would have gone back to a 
normal man's life who goes to the restaurant or the bakery. 
45 Folha de São Paulo (Brazilian newspaper), C4, 05/26/2011.  
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cumprimento da sentença"
46. Also, according to the minister "a demora em cumprir penas do 
tipo  cria  na  sociedade  uma  sensação  de  impunidade  e  elimina  o  que  chama  de  aspecto 
psicológico da pena". (Folha São Paulo, C1, 5/26/2011).
47 
As pointed out by Habermas in  Die Neue Unübersichtlichkeit
48, since the late eighteenth 
century, history is conceived as a worldwide process that generates problems. The increasing 
complexity of today's social relationships has contributed to the increased litigation that expects 
pacified solutions from the justice. However, as noted in the examples above, we find that the 
judiciary is still unable to satisfactorily answer even with process celerity. The judiciary does not 
have Know-how or technical instrumentality capable of pragmatically operationalizing the gears, 
which would minimally ensure an expectation of trustworthiness of the citizens who rely on their 
institutions. 
Moreover, the examples mentioned show an even more stunning implication in the link that 
keeps the legal bond connected to society: ethical values. Lack of confidence in the impartiality 
of the Judiciary and distrust in its honesty are elements that are not measured by the effectiveness 
of pragmatic action revealed in numbers of cases adjudicated. This is not about numbers and 
charts  that  may  testify  before  the  challenges  that  the  judiciary  continues  to  work  adding 
efficiency towards the cases judged. Ethical values are incommensurable and, thus, honesty and 
trust are values that should appear unquestionable, at least in such important institution of the 
Republic whose telos is the promotion of the highest degree of justice. 
Habermas  points  out  in  several  passages  of  his  Faktizität  und  Geltung.  Beiträge  zur 
Diskurstheorie  des  Rechts  und  des  demokratischen  Reschtsstaats,  that  ethical  issues  have  a 
referral system for social regulation that is found inside the political community, as participants 
seek a collective and conscious self-understanding, based on shared traditions and values.
49 In the 
area of ethical and political issues, the reasoning of the standards has, as a reference system, the 
set of members who share certain cultural tradition. The arguments used to justify regulations and 
                                                           
46 All ministers were textual, attributing this delay to the excessive amount of resources (24 resources in total). The 
defense used all available resources and prevented the fulfillment of the sentence. 
47 The delay in serving sentences of the kind creates a sense of impunity in society and eliminates what he calls the 
psychological aspect of the punishment. 
48 Jürgen Habermas, Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschöpfung utopischer Energien, in: Jürgen 
Habermas, Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit. Kleine politische Schriften V (1985), 141. See Jürgen Habermas, A nova 
intransparência, Novos Estudos CEBRAP, n. 18 (1987), portuguese translation (by Carlos Alberto Marques Novaes), 
103-114.  
49 Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen 
Reschtsstaats, 1994, 139-140. See Jürgen Habermas, Direito e Democracia: entre facticidade e validade, portuguese 
translation (by Flávio Beno Siebeneichler) 1997, 143-144.   
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norms must be accepted by those involved in the cultural frame of reference that takes place in 
the negotiation of commitments. So, cultural ballast unfolds the values accepted and recognized 
as valid for the cohesion and integration of a particular political community. This demonstrates, 
in general, that the legal regulations restricted to the scope of ethical and political issues have 
limited validity inscribed to the circle of those affected and, through them, the face of the legal 
system is built. 
The institution of the judiciary cannot refuse to shape itself, ignoring the significant and 
latent aspect of the values  derived from the ethical-political structure of society. So when it 
allows  it  to  happen,  it  runs  the  risk  of  mischaracterizing  itself  as  a  legitimate  institution  to 
safeguard the performance of the validity claims of justice in society. There is no performance of 
justice - in the fully moral sense - if the Judiciary fails to comply with the pragmatic actions that 
seek to be effective and rapid in the progress of proceedings and, moreover, proposing ethical 
actions that corroborate with the expectation that the society has towards the legal institution. 
To the purpose of fully exhausting the assumptions of practical reasoning, an unchallenged 
aspect of the judiciary is in the full realization of morality, that is, in the decision of practical 
issues in general judged fairly and rationally, providing the parties with symmetrical participation 
conditions and, equally, with the also impartial recognition of norms of action. In this sense, the 
scope of the moral issues should be taken as a reference for the basis of regulations of all the 
symmetrical interest, i.e. it should require, in an optimal plan, the consent of all members of a 
supposed republic of citizens or the humanity itself. The level of morality shifts from the material 
and  value  aspects  inscribed  in  the  facticity  of  a  political  community  to  embark  on  abstract 
principles rationally justified. 
In addressing the evaluation of moral issues, Habermas refers to the fundamental principle of 
discourse, which takes the form of universalization principle - taken as a rule for argumentation - 
so that the reference system for the basis of standards extends to humanity in general. In this case, 
the reasons given in favor of a particular norm should (power) be accepted by all, making the 
supposed  humanity  or  'republic  of  citizens'  present  itself  as  an  inalienable  horizon  of  moral 
schematization. 
However,  the  principle  of  discourse,  for  Habermas,  takes  the  form  of  the  principle  of 
democracy, in that it attaches to the medium of law, thus forming the system of rights that gives  
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access to public autonomy in a relationship of reciprocal presupposition. 
50 Thus, the law grants, 
under the light of the discourse principle (Principle of Democracy) the conditions for the created 
and/or implemented legal framework to hold legitimacy from the standpoint of morality (justice) 
without  neglecting  the  value  dimension  of  society  (ethics)  and,  also,  the  instrumentality 
(pragmatic) of law to stabilize the expectations of individual and social behavior. 
 
Conclusion  
Significant advances occurred even in the increasing access to the Judiciary, especially, followed 
by adding new resources and technological support. However, the empirical reality still requires a 
move in the full exercise of the Democratic State of Law, strengthening its essence in institutions 
to more strongly assert the principles of justice. 
If, as we saw above, the moral principle operates at the level of internal constitution, that is, 
within the internal control of behavior anchored in the individual's subjective consciousness, the 
principle of democracy, by contrast, operates at the level of external institutionalization in the 
sense  of  ensuring,  in  an  effective  way,  balanced  participation  of  all  concerned  ones  in  the 
formation of discursive opinion and will. Thus, the principle of democracy states that “[...] daß 
nur  die  juridischen  Gesetze  legitime  Geltung  beanspruchen  dürfen,  die  in  einem  ihrerseits 
rechtlich verfaßten diskursiven Rechtsetzungsprozeß die Zustimmung aller Rechtsgenossen finden 
k￶nnen”.
51 
52 The principle of democracy aims, in that matter, at demonstrating how the political 
opinion and the will can be institutionalized through a system of rights that guarantees everyone's 
participation in the process of legal normalization. Thus, it is possible to signal that the system of 
rights, in Habermas evaluation, must meet two fundamental tasks: the institutionalization of the 
formation of political rational will, as well as serve as a medium for expressing the common will 
of members of law that associate freely.
53 
Thus, the normative legitimacy of law derives from the conditions of the legal system to 
ensure, in the arena of Democratic State of Law, the formation of an unbiased opinion and will 
through a procedural rationality (discourse theory) able to weave ethical, moral and political 
                                                           
50 See Habermas (note 49), 162. See Direito e Democracia: entre facticidade e validade, 1997, 165. 
51 [...] can only claim legitimate validity the legal laws capable of finding the consent of all partners in the law, in a 
process of legal normalization. 
52 See Habermas (note 49), 141. See Direito e Democracia: entre facticidade e validade, 1997, 145 (“somente 
podem pretender validade legitima as leis jurídicas capazes de encontrar o assentimento de todos os parceiros do 
direito, num processo de normatização jurídica”). 
53 See Habermas (note 49), 142-143. See  Direito e Democracia: entre facticidade e validade, 1997, 146-147.  
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components, all democratically consolidated. Demonstration that the judiciary - in the context of 
complex contemporary societies that adjust to requirements of a Democratic State of Law - goes 
beyond  the  mere  exercise  of  corrective  and  pragmatic  instrumental  reason,  being  effectively 
aimed  at  incorporating  the  fullness  of  practical  reason  (ethics,  morals  and  political)  in  their 
communicative actions and always open in the public sphere. 
Anyway, the result demonstrated in this study was the increased volume of litigation verified 
since the 1990s in the context of the Brazilian reality, what caused the opening of the judiciary to 
new  technologies  which  facilitate  access  to  justice  and  also  the  faster  resolution  of  works. 
However,  with  the  intense  insertion,  in  recent  years,  of  the  technical  rationalization  in  the 
operationalization of procedural and decision making justice, ultimately promoted a 'legalization' 
supported on assumptions of technical-instrumental regulation. Facing the political goals set by 
the CNJ, it was noted the intensification of instrumental rationality "with respect to purpose", 
which has increasingly required of law operators the mere achievement of previously established 
goals. 
The  issue,  however,  that  we  sought  to  answer  was  whether  the  implementation  of  new 
technologies to address the growing complexity of litigation arising from complexity of society 
has sufficient results to adjust the Law in a post-conventional platform. If the social complexity 
drives resources from new technologies, it is not certain that such technologies, by themselves, 
are able to satisfactorily respond to a model that, from the legal point of view of legitimacy and 
post-conventional normativity, is suited to the complex societies. This demonstrates, in turn, that 
a legal model able to account for plurality, must also take into account, besides the rules of 
instrumental rationality, the fundamental requirements of communicative rationality. 
There  is  still  a  long  way  to  the  empirical  confirmation  of  whether  the  expansion  of 
instrumental rationality in the judiciary also allows the court to extend the fruitful conditions of 
communicative rationality in the formation of consensual opinion and will in a Democratic post-
conventional State of Law. 
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